Geopolitics
What we are tracking
Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned Secretary of State Marco Rubio in an October 23 memo that Iranian plotting against US personnel has reached advanced stages in the Middle East and elsewhere. State updated travel advisories for 13 countries, ordered non-emergency staff and families out of Saudi Arabia, and placed embassies in Lebanon, Jordan, the UAE and Qatar on reduced operations. The New York Times reports that CENTCOM planning details an expanded target list including Iranian energy infrastructure, and that Trump privately appears to be leaning toward major strikes after the November 3 midterms. Iranian officials have told mediators they would widen attacks across Gulf states to economic assets, with airports, pipelines, regional data centres and undersea cables in the strait all named publicly. Against that backdrop, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir and Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Pezeshkian in Tehran on Monday, the first joint Mecca pact engagement with Iran. Qatari mediators were there the day before. The framework under discussion is a short sequence of mutual concessions reopening Hormuz against lifting the US naval blockade, but sequencing and Iran’s 440kg stockpile of highly enriched uranium remain unresolved.
Why it matters
Two political calendars are now driving the risk. Trump has said he will not act before the midterms and has hinted all bets are off afterwards, while Netanyahu faces an election Tuesday and may calculate that a final strike is easier to order now than later. The NYT’s framing is the one worth holding onto: this is how conflicts escalate by accident rather than by decision, and a single incident involving a US official or an Iranian leadership site could be enough. For Gulf business, the material change is the stated target set. Data centres and undersea cables move the risk calculation beyond energy and shipping into connectivity and digital infrastructure, at a moment when the region is building exactly that. Worth noting that the intelligence itself has drawn internal scepticism, with only the Gang of 8 briefed before the letter went public and officials questioning why it was released without substantiating detail.
What to watch
Whether the Qatari framework survives the sequencing dispute and the enriched uranium question; what Netanyahu does in the days around Tuesday’s vote; whether further US staff drawdowns follow across Gulf embassies; and whether the Mecca pact channel to Tehran produces anything beyond agreement to keep talking.
Regional Security
What we are tracking
The Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia has become markedly more precise. Three ballistic missiles struck the al-Alam camp in Shabwah on October 19 just as four battalions massed for a training event, killing at least 75 and wounding more than 200 including Saudi troops, the deadliest single attack of the new war. Drones had circled the site for days and there was no air defence cover. It followed strikes on Al-Maashiq Palace in Aden on October 15 that hit Saudi officers’ housing, and an attack near Mukalla shortly after Saudi reinforcements arrived. Analysts describe systematic targeting of reinforcements, ammunition shipments and recruitment gatherings, and Yemeni officials suspect informers inside the camp. A UN report last year documented Houthi interception of communications through their control of San’a telecoms. Separately, Riyadh is repairing relations with Abu Dhabi, with Prince Khalid meeting Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed on October 18 following Sheikh Mansour’s Riyadh visit last month, the first royal contact since the two fell out over Yemen in December. The UK has sent fighter jets, France military assistance for energy installations, and Egypt’s parliament has authorised defensive support.
Why it matters
The intelligence dimension is the story, not the casualty figures. A militia that can observe a training rotation and strike it at the moment of maximum concentration is operating at a different level from 2015, and Saudi Arabia faces a choice between recruiting more local fighters or committing its own forces to a conflict where neither option is attractive. The coalition-building is equally telling. Washington has declined to join the fightback, which is why Riyadh is assembling support from the UK, France, Turkey, Pakistan and now Egypt, and why the UAE rapprochement matters. Analysts caution it is tactical rather than strategic, with divergent threat perceptions, oil policy and Sudan still unresolved, and the likelier vehicle being activation of GCC Peninsula Shield rather than a formal return to the Yemen alliance. Egypt’s authorisation is the most striking element, given Cairo’s memory of its 1962 deployment and its refusal to join the 2015 coalition.
What to watch
Whether Saudi-backed forces make progress or Riyadh commits its own troops; whether air defence is extended to forward positions in Yemen; whether the UAE moves from dialogue to material re-engagement; and whether Turkey’s parliament ratifies the Mecca pact, which currently prevents any Turkish deployment.
Diplomacy
What we are tracking
The UAE has formally nominated Lana Zaki Nusseibeh, its former deputy foreign minister and ambassador to the UN for over a decade, to succeed Antonio Guterres. She is the seventh active candidate and entered after no clear front-runner emerged, with Rebeca Grynspan having won five of six non-binding Security Council ballots and leaked results suggesting every leading candidate has met resistance from at least one permanent member. Nusseibeh has pledged full independence, saying she would govern with a commitment only to the UN and its charter, has taken a leave of absence from the UAE government, and has named Sudan as a top priority. Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has criticised the nomination; she has said she would engage with Iran as with any member state.
Why it matters
A Gulf candidate at the top of the UN would be a step change in the region’s international standing, and Nusseibeh’s profile fits the UAE’s self-positioning as a mediator. The obstacles are structural rather than personal. The informal regional rotation favours Latin America and the Caribbean, many member states want the first woman in the role from that region, and any candidate needs nine Security Council votes without a veto.
What to watch
Whether any permanent member signals support or opposition publicly; whether the regional rotation convention holds; and whether Oman’s call this week for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran gains traction as a parallel diplomatic track.
Trade and Infrastructure
What we are tracking
DP World has signed a memorandum of understanding with Arctic Gateway Group, owner and operator of the Churchill port and its railway, and CentrePort Canada, covering port operations and a possible transport corridor linking Churchill to DP World’s global network. A Canadian government prospectus puts full expansion at $57 billion with preliminary investment requests of $3.9 billion, aiming to turn the Hudson Bay outpost into a four-season gateway through an LNG export corridor, rail upgrades, port modernisation and all-weather road access. It was announced as Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan visited Ottawa on October 26 and 27. Canada and the UAE concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in a record 47 days in July, following a FIPA that entered into force in May, and the UAE committed C$70 billion, around $49.9 billion, to Canadian investment last year. Talks covered defence and security, energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, space and AI.
Why it matters
Arctic Gateway’s chief executive made the strategic logic explicit, arguing that with Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb both unstable, Canada can position itself as a reliable corridor for Asia-Europe trade, with transit times comparable to the Red Sea and Suez route. That reframes the deal: this is not DP World expanding its Canadian footprint, it is a Gulf operator building optionality around the chokepoints its own region depends on, in the same strategic family as Fujairah, Khor Fakkan and the east coast pipelines. The Ottawa visit also continues the Canada-Gulf axis that has been forming since Carney took office, with Canada diversifying away from US trade exposure and the Gulf reciprocating.
What to watch
Whether the MoU converts into committed capital and on what timeline; whether icebreaker capacity extends the Hudson Bay shipping season as planned; what emerges from the Ottawa meetings on critical minerals and AI; and whether other Gulf operators pursue comparable Arctic or northern European positions.
Capital and Investment
What we are tracking
Apollo is taking a minority stake of nearly 10 per cent in Mubadala Capital, with Apollo and other strategic investors committing around $5 billion at initial close. Mubadala Investment Company remains majority shareholder and Apollo joins Silver Rock Financial’s founders as an equity holder, with completion expected in the fourth quarter. Mubadala Capital’s wholly owned core alternatives businesses manage more than $60 billion, and the firm manages, advises and administers more than $755 billion in total. CNBC broke the story before the companies confirmed it. Separately, Brookfield is opening a Doha office anchored by its global credit platform including Oaktree, having built roughly $20 billion in GCC assets, and building on a $20 billion AI infrastructure partnership with Qai, now housed within the QIA’s new domestic vehicle Doha Investment. Advent International, Eurazeo, EQT and Pantheon have all opened Abu Dhabi offices in recent days, and Robinhood plans to launch its retail platform from Dubai next year.
Why it matters
The direction of travel is unchanged by the war, and in some respects accelerated by it. What is new is the structure. Apollo is not deploying capital alongside a Gulf fund, it is buying into the manager itself, which is a different kind of commitment and a signal that American firms see scale in Gulf platforms rather than just capital. Brookfield’s Doha move is notable for its timing, given Qatar’s energy position: the March strike on Ras Laffan removed roughly 17 per cent of LNG export capacity, with losses estimated at $20 billion and repairs expected to take at least three years. Global managers are establishing themselves in a market whose core export earnings are impaired, which tells you they are underwriting the sovereign balance sheet and the AI buildout rather than the hydrocarbon cycle.
What to watch
Whether more global managers take equity in Gulf platforms rather than simply opening offices; how the Doha Investment restructuring changes QIA’s domestic deployment; and whether the office-opening wave continues if escalation resumes after the midterms.
Sudan
What we are tracking
The Economist’s 1843 published a long-form account on October 24 of the fall of el-Fasher, reconstructing the final months of the Saudi maternity hospital, the last functioning medical facility in a city that once held a million people. The Rapid Support Forces overran el-Fasher on October 26 last year, a year to the day before the piece appeared. The UN has since concluded that what followed bore the hallmarks of genocide, and has said roughly 460 people were killed when the hospital itself was taken, most of them patients. The account is built on the testimony of doctors and staff who stayed through an eighteen-month siege under drone and artillery bombardment, through famine conditions and a cholera outbreak, and who were captured as the city fell.
Why it matters
Sudan is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and it has been persistently under-covered relative to its scale. That alone is reason to put it in front of readers.
What to watch
How the ICJ proceedings advance and what disclosure they compel; whether the anniversary of el-Fasher’s fall generates sustained diplomatic attention or passes as previous milestones have; and whether a credible ceasefire and political process emerges, which remains the only route to addressing the underlying crisis.
Related articles
- Intelligence memo warns Iran is plotting to kill Americans in Middle East (Financial Times)
- A New Level of Threat and Fear Risks Pushing the U.S. and Iran Back to Full War (The New York Times)
- Iran Threatens Wider Strikes on Economic and Civilian Targets if U.S. Attacks (The Wall Street Journal)
- Iran hosts regional powers for talks to prevent fresh escalation (Financial Times)
- Flurry of Diplomacy in Iran as Regional Countries Try to Stave Off War (The New York Times)
- Saudi-Led Troops Had Just Gathered When a Houthi Missile Left Dozens Dead (The Wall Street Journal)
- Saudi Arabia seeks to mend ties with UAE in Houthi crisis (Financial Times)
- Apollo Takes Stake in Mubadala Capital, Deepening Abu Dhabi Ties (Bloomberg)
- Brookfield to Open Doha Office to Deepen Middle East Reach (Bloomberg)
- Dubai’s DP World Talks Alliance With Northern Canada Port (Bloomberg)
- U.A.E. Diplomat Jolts Deadlocked U.N. Leadership Race (The Wall Street Journal)
- UAE’s Lana Nusseibeh Vows Independence If Elected UN Chief (Bloomberg)
- UAE Economy Slows as War Hits Business Activity (AGBI)
- A genocidal militia was coming for his city. He was one of the last doctors left (The Economist’s 1843)
